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Testnet — all figures are testnet or illustrative. Not mainnet.
abstract

Run a node

Node economics

The mechanics of operating a validator: how rewards fund security, what slashing and jailing penalise, and the timing parameters that govern an operator's bond.

Security economics

Rewards fund security.

Rewards exist to compensate operators for the cost and risk of securing the network. They are a security budget, not a return — the figure that matters is whether the network stays neutral and live.

Reward sourcesecurity budget + settlement fees// indicative — confirm
Reward rate// indicative — confirm
Commission to delegatorsset per operator// indicative — confirm

Penalties

Slashing and jailing.

The network protects itself by penalising operators that act against it or go dark. Slashing removes bonded stake; jailing temporarily ejects an operator from the active set.

Slashing — equivocationbonded stake at risk// indicative — confirm
Slashing — provable faultbonded stake at risk// indicative — confirm
Jailing — downtimeremoved from active set// indicative — confirm
Slashing amount// indicative — confirm

Slashing risk is real

Bonded stake can be slashed for equivocation or provable faults, and an operator can be jailed for downtime. Run redundant, well-monitored infrastructure and never run two nodes signing with the same key. Confirmed conditions and amounts are published in the docs.

Timing

Uptime, epochs, and unbonding.

Operators commit to an uptime target, are evaluated over epochs, and must wait through an unbonding period before stake becomes liquid again.

Uptime target// indicative — confirm
Epoch length// indicative — confirm
Unbonding period// indicative — confirm

Honest economics. Honest risk.

Security economics, stated mechanically — rewards, slashing, and the timing that binds them.